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This thesis analyzes in depth the Army's PEGASUS free-
play, manual war game, and develops in detail the event-
sequenced logic which comprises the battle simulation. The
resulting logic has been structured to serve as a framework
for the programming of an interactive, computer-supported,
battalion-level war game. The game is designed for 2 play-
ers, rather than the 35-^0 required in the PEGASUS manual
mode, with the players role-playing the adversary force
commanders. Battle results are determined stochastically,
and relevant battle information is filtered and displayed to
the players to enhance their tactical decision-making.
The framework is sufficiently flexible so that future
weapon systems and sophisticated sensors can be incorporated
into the game. Exercising this potential in future studies
may provide unique insights into the processing of informa-
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Few of mankind's undertakings compare with war for its
complexity, intensity, or total commitment of men and
material. Nothing has stimulated more effort, thought,
ingenuity , and resourcefulness than such ventures. The
dedication of this effort has created the uniquely diverse
and technically sophisticated fighting systems that now
comprise modern conventional forces. These technology-
based developments are dramatically changing the nature of
the battlefield. Heretofore our ground combat operations
have been characterized by massive amounts of firepower in
search of targets. "Reconnaissance by fire" and artillery
"harassment and interdiction" have become standard U.S.
tactics. But now the modern battlefield promises to be
alive with targets. Sophisticated, specialized radars,
laser sights, electro-optical seekers, aerial reconnaissance
drones and other recent developments have conspired to
reverse the traditional tactical problem; rather than too
few targets, there may now be too many - too many, at least,
to be easily processed by existing battlefield decision-
making .
The requirements for a command-control-information
system to support and effect the management of the modern,
automated battlefield will be significantly different from
solutions that have been successful in the past. Clearly,
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the commanders perception of the battlefield will be
uniquely different. Within the context of command and con-
trol, the commander must be supported by a battlefield in-
formation system which will provide him with competent key
information in a responsive time frame. The concern then
becomes: what is the key information? What is that infor-
mation which when appropriately digested and synthesized,
correctly contributes to the commanders perception of the
battlefield and enhances his decision-making capabilities?
Any viable discussion of key information required in
combat must have its genesis in an even more basic question:
what are the key decision-making processes required to
conduct and sustain combat operations? Amid the turmoil and
chaos that characterizes the battlefield there must exist a
structure of information transactions to support these
decision-making processes. If the collective structure can
be ascertained and understood, the value and character of
decision-supporting information, of key-information, can be
more clearly defined.
It is the premise of this thesis that an understanding
of the collective structure of combat decision-making processes
may be achieved by study of existing manual war games.
Accordingly, this thesis analyzes in depth the Army's
PEGASUS war game, a manual, free-play, battle simulation
which productively exercises brigade and battalion commanders
and their staffs in the command and control of combined arms
operations. The analysis develops in detail the event
Ik

sequenced logic which comprises the battle simulation, and
structures it to serve as the framework for the programming
of an interactive, computer-supported, battalion level
war game. The war game is designed for 2 opposing players,
rather than the 35-^0 players required in the PEGASUS manual
mode, and accordingly significant filtering of information
is required in order not to overwhelm the decision-maker.
This report begins with a chapter providing a general
description of the objectives and procedures of the manual
PEGASUS war game. An overview of the analysis effort is then
presented, discussing those parameters and procedures germane
to an understanding of the computer-supported war game, and
providing the context within which the detailed discussions
which follow relate. PEGASUS is an intricately structured
war game, dependent upon the application of specific game
rules and controller interactions to generate the battle
simulation. It is precisely this structure which makes the
game adaptable to the objectives of this thesis effort. The
reduction of this structure to computer programming logic
is presented in detailed discussions of indirect fire, target
acquisition, direct fire and movement simulations. The
relevance of the developed framework to future study efforts




II. THE PEGASUS MANUAL WAR GAME
A. GENERAL
The PEGASUS battle simulation is a free-play, manual
war game which exercises brigade and/or battalion commanders
and their staffs in the command and control of combined
arms operations. By simulating real-time events, PEGASUS
serves as a unique training vehicle and tactical laboratory;
it provides commanders and their staffs an opportunity to
work together under the time constraints and stresses of
real life battle situations, against a thinking and competent
adversary. Accordingly it is utilized to support the Army
Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) at the Battalion
and Brigade levels, in order to evaluate the strengths and
weaknesses of a unit's procedures and training.
B. PEGASUS CONCEPT AND ORGANIZATION
Real time multi-echelon operations are an important
feature of the PEGASUS war game. The rules and sequence
of play are designed to conform to time/distance factors
assumed for the modern battlefield. Therefore the command
groups are required to act and react with real-time decisions




There are two groups of participants required to conduct




The players plan and execute the exercise. As the
command group they set up a command and control system,
plan the tactical mission, prepare maps, orders, and over-
lays, and issue orders. They interact with one another,
and fight the battle. There is no prescribed organization
for the player group; it consists of those individuals
normally constituting the command group of the tactical
operations center of the brigade and/or battalions during
combat operations. Their roles are played as they would
be in any real situation; they need not be familiar with
the simulation procedures.
2. Control Group
The control group prepares and controls the
exercise. There are three categories of control personnel:
a. Controllers
Controllers have overall supervisory responsibil-
ities for the conduct and evaluation of the exercise. They
represent the higher and adjacent units with which the
players may communicate during the exercise, providing re-
ports, requirements and information representative of that
generated in a combat environment. These individuals are
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neutral and have the primary responsibility for maintaining
the pace and efficient flow of the exercise.
b. Functional Controllers
Functional controllers support areas of special
or amplified play. There are required functional controllers
dedicated to areas such as indirect fire support and intelli-
gence, and optional controllers in areas such as administra-
tion/logistics, engineering, or chemical/nuclear warfare.
The optional controllers are not required unless their




These are the individuals who provide the inter-
face or link: between the simulation and the players. They
are "players" in the sense that they are part or either
the friendly or opposing side, and must exercise tactical
judgement and respond to tactical decisions that support
their side. They are "controllers" in that they must trans-
late tactical decisions into simulation procedures governed
by the rules of play for movement and the rules for the
conduct of appropriate engagements. Player-controllers
perform duties essentially paralleling unit assignments,
such as unit controllers (company commanders) and forward
observers.
The total number of controllers required depends
on the scenerio and the scope of the exercise. A battalion
level war game requires approximately 20 controllers, while
a brigade exercise may require more than 65 controllers.
18

C. THE PEGASUS EXERCISE
The exercise is initiated when the players (command
groups) are briefed on a particular scenerio by the con-
trollers, given an appropriate mission, and are required to
plan the execution of the mission. During the exercise the
players operate from a tactical operations center (generally
in the field) , and the controllers work in facilities near,
but not co-located with, the player group. Organic tactical
communications equipments are used to facilitate communications
between the players and the controllers, and are employed
to realistically represent those equipments and communica-
tion networks that would be used in combat. Utilizing this
communications capability, the players communicate freely
with the controllers during the game play. Decisions are
made and directives and orders are issued by the players.
The controllers then simulate the operation in real-time on
a specially designed control board in accordance with a
set of rules for fire and maneuver, and assess the results
of each conflict phase. Information and data from each
resulting interaction, as appropriate, are then fed back to
the players as the battle unfolds. Using this updated
status information, the players interactively modify their
orders and dynamically direct the battle, and the controllers
appropriately execute the operations and report the outcomes.
Since the rules and sequence of play are designed to conform
to time and distance factors, the players are forced to
react in real-time, thereby creating a decision-stress
19

environment similar to that of actual battle. Since the
PEGASUS war game is a free-play exercise, it realistically
portrays the uncertainty of battle. The relative success
of the opposing forces, therefore, will depend principally
on the actions of the respective players; the command groups
will influence the outcome of the battle in direct accordance
with their ability to make responsive and tactically sound
decisions.
The PEGASUS battle simulation can support a command
post exercise of approximately eight hours in length. Long-
er exercises are possible, but would require additional
controllers for relief. The system can be tailored to
amplify play in several functional areas, such as air de-
fense, electronic warfare, and engineer operations, and can
be adapted to any terrain for which 1:12,500 scale maps
can be fabricated.
D. CONTROL BOARD -
The PEGASUS control board is the playing surface on
which the simulation is conducted. It is composed of 12
sections (each 2 feet by 3 feet) which, together, form a
control board measuring 6 feet by 12 feet. The control
board is actually a reproduction of a standard 1:50,000
topographic map enlarged to a scale of 1:12,500 and printed
on sheets of polyester. Its most unique feature is a
hexagonal grid, superimposed on and corresponding to the
Military Grid Reference System of the map. Hexes are used
20

in lieu of squares because it permits more realistic move-
ment of units - six directions rather than four - which
results in a more accurate time -distance portrayal of move-
ment. Movement is regulated by terrain effects, and the
movement costs associated with each hex depends on the
predominant terrain feature within the hex. Unit "playing
pieces" or "counters," with the standard military symbol
of the unit to help identify it, are used to represent
each unit on the control board. It should be emphasized
that the players do not have access to the control board,
and in fact develop their plans and operations using
standard 1:50,000 topographic maps. The control board is
used exclusively by the controllers to systematically
effect the movement of units and to assist in the resolution
of conflicts.
E. GENERAL SEQUENCE OF PLAY
Play of the war game is divided into 12 minute turns
during which the controllers and players of each side move
and fight their units. Since each game turn represents a
12 minute "slice" of the battle, allocation of indirect
fire, conduct of direct fire, and movement are all designed
to be representative of the pace of combat expected on the
battlefield. Resolution of these various aspects of combat
is simplified by executing each game turn in a specified and
21

orderly sequence. Each game turn is divided into the





Requests for indirect fire can be initiated anytime
during a game turn; however, to provide for the realistic
time lag that normally occurs between the request and the
receipt of fire, the results are resolved only during the
indirect fire phase of the next game turn. Indirect fire
support includes not only artillery support, but also close
air support and attack helicopter missions.
2. Direct Fire Phase
Requests for direct fire are planned at the end of
each game turn to be executed and the results resolved
during this phase. Execution of direct fire missions are
conditioned upon the target unit being within range of the
firing unit, as well as being in line-of -sight of the firing
unit.
3. Movement Phase
Movement is a complex and important aspect of the
simulation. Each unit begins each turn of game play with
an allowance of 12 movement minutes, which can be expended
in several ways (including movement and direct fire) . Terrain
characteristics dictate those corresponding costs associated
22

with actual movement. However, movement can also reveal
units and trigger direct fire. Effects of direct fire in
this phase are assessed immediately, and requests for return
fire missions can be made and again are immediately executed
and resolved (assuming the firing unit has sufficient move-
ment minutes available to absorb the cost of the mission)
.
This is the dynamic and interactive phase of the simulation
for the controllers. When the desired objectives are
reached, or a unit has exhausted its movement allowance, or
movement is interrupted by opposing forces actions, the
movement phase is completed.
There are a series of basic rules for PEGASUS which
are used to simulate the basic fire and maneuver functions
of the tactical units within each of these phases. They
specify the effects of terrain, the rules for observation
and movement, the employment of direct and indirect fire,
and the conduct of close assaults. The rules are extensive,
and have applicability to the potential activities of all
type maneuver units in the U.S. Army organization, contributing
to a potentially comprehensive and realistic battle simulation.
F. CONFLICT RESOLUTION - THE COMBAT RESULTS TABLES
Conflict resolution is probabilistically determined by
use of a series of PEGASUS Combat Results Tables. The
tables have been developed for the full range of combat
weapon systems and generalized target categories. They are
structured to provide the losses resulting from specific
23

weapon system/target engagements, v/hile appropriately
considering the modifying effects of range, target disposition,
target size, etc. Figure IV. 2 reproduces the indirect fire
combat results tables for the U.S. vs. dismounted troops in
the offense. Casualties are determined by first searching
the table for the appropriate firing mission criteria
(artillery round caliber and intensity of fire), and find-
ing the intersection of that row with the target (squad,
platoon, company) column. A die roll is used to select
which of the corresponding 6 possible outcomes will apply
for the engagement. There are 60 such tables for resolving
just the artillery indirect fire support and direct fire
missions, and accordingly the majority of the controller's
time is spent rolling a die and looking up tables for
resolution of each engagement!
G. APPLICABILITY OF PEGASUS TO COMPUTER SIMULATION
The description provided of the PEGASUS battle simula-
tion in the previous pages is too general in its overview
to give a full appreciation for the comprehensive and flex-
ibility of its structure. The war game productively exercises
full battalion and brigade level staffs in their attempt to
plan and conduct operations against a thinking and purpose-
ful opponent; and its free play nature realistically portrays
the uncertainty, and hence the frustration, of battle.
2k

PEGASUS at first appears to be a complex exercise. It
is an intricately structured war game, dependent upon the
application of specific game rules and controller inter-
actions to generate the battle simulation. But it is
precisely this structure which makes this game adaptable to
the objectives of this thesis effort. The reduction of
any game to computer assisted play requires that events be
logically sequenced and time-stepped. Accordingly, the
structure of the PEGASUS game is uniquely compatible with
this programming requirement. Further, even in the manual
mode, the game provides operationally significant detail
within acceptable user turn-around times; accordingly the
reducing of the controller conflict resolution responsibil-
ities to computer calculations offers the potential for
increased responsiveness.
Most importantly, the PEGASUS war game provides meaning-
ful representations of the battlefield situation, inter-
actions, and events. Accordingly, if the game can be
successfully reduced to computer-assisted play, it offers
the potential to assist players in gaining valid, non-
trivial insights into the complex operational problems that
comprise the battlefield. Further, the structure of the
manual war game is such that it is capable of being tailored
to incorporate new weapon systems and new sensors into the
game. This flexibility and growth potential is a particularly





Models tend to be as simple and concise as our knowledge
of the activity warrants. The Army has used 'models' of
military operations, specifically manual war games and field
exercises, for many years; their purposes have been to en-
hance training, test plans, and achieve insight into the
complexities of battle. With the development of high-speed
computers came the ability to play war games more rapidly
and to include much more detail. At the same time ( and no
doubt in part due to this improved capability) , there was
an increased awareness of the need to examine new weapons
in a "combined arms" context, in a complete battle environ-
ment rather than in isolation. The purpose of gaming and
simulation therefore tended to broaden from training objectives
to comparison of alternative forces and major weapon systems.
More significantly, it changed from a relatively simple and
"visible" aid to judgement, to an esoteric, complicated, and
transparent producer of battle outcomes, rigidly constrained
by automated procedures.
The manual PEGASUS game represents the Army's commitment
to reverse this trend, to maintain a capability to play free
war games in which imaginative military players can gain
insight by 'experiencing' land warfare and exercising the
26

tactical employment of forces. The significance of the
game, for academic purposes, is that it creates a neutral
"playing field" upon which the battle simulation takes
place. This feature must be emphasized; just as a chess-
board can accomodate a wide range of player skills (from
novice to master) , so can the manual PEGASUS war game
accomodate varying levels of sophistication and complexity,
and hence player skills. The purpose of this chapter is
to discuss the level of sophistication contemplated for this
neutral, computer-assisted simulation, and to provide an
overview of the game procedures that effect it.
B. BATTALION-LEVEL PLAY
The reduction of a manual war game which productively
exercises full brigade and battalion staffs down to a comput-
er-assisted game involving two players is a nontrivial task.
The multi-echelon decision-making requirements in a brigade
scenerio does not lend itself to simple reduction to one
player decisions. At the battalion level, however, the
situation is perceptively different. The scope of command
for a battalion commander extends down to the platoon as
the basic maneuver unit, and it is at the platoon level
that the majority of the PEGASUS simulation is exercised.
Further, assuming that a player would exercise tactical
prudence by maintaining a significant reserve capability
(both at the battalion and company level), the number of
forward line maneuver units appears to be within a players
27

intellectual ability to control. Play at the battalion
level also requires a significantly smaller maneuver or
playing area, a realistic consideration that influences
the amount of effort involved in establishing a computer
terrain characterization of the battle area.
Even at the battalion level there exists multi-echelon
and multi -dimensional decision-making that contributes to
the effectiveness of a maneuver unit in combat, and it is
unrealistic to consider that all this decision-making
expertise would be resident in one player (that of the
battalion commander) . Accordingly, there has been a conscious
effort to make as much of the detail of the PEGASUS war game
transparent to the player as possible, allowing him to
concentrate his intellectual skills in massing his firepower
and maneuver elements, vice being distracted by some of the
more mundane (though important) considerations of combat
(i.e., ammunition constraints, artillery weapons selection,
etc.). The constraints on the commanders resources and
capabilities represent important tactical considerations,
and therefore extensively exist within the transparent
structure of the simulation; they do not, however, represent
considerations that must be constantly placed before the
battalion commander to allow him to effectively exercise
command.
The PEGASUS war game owes its complexity in part to its
flexible design, which allows for almost all combat functions
to be simulated. Minefields, chemical/nuclear warfare,
28

engineer operations, air defense, and other "functional"
capabilities can be exercised in the manual game. Incorpora-
tion of procedures to exercise these functional areas has
not been attempted in the computer-assisted simulation, as
they introduce a level of management complexity inconsistent
with the overall objectives of the simulation. Similarly,
considerations such as night operations, use of smoke, and
air and helicopter support, all of which would increase the
realism associated with game play, have not been incorporated
into the simulation procedures because of the complex rules
associated with their play.
C. ROLE OF THE PLAYER
It is not the intent of this effort to get intensely
involved in the substantive issues of modeling and simula-
tion techniques. Nor is there an explicit desire to make
the simulation a forum for improving the tactical sophisti-
cation of the players. The objective is to involve the
players, as adversary commanders, in a conflict on a neutral
and realistically representative battlefield. The players,
irrespective of their skill levels, must maneuver their
forces to complete their scenerio-defined mission. Their
skill at interpreting the battlefield information available
to them should enhance their game play. The level of
battlefield information available to the players will be
essentially consistent with the information sensors played.
29

As enhancements are overlayed the basic procedures, the
information available to the players can be modified to
reflect increased sensors, and corresponding subjective
judgements can be made regarding the utility of this in-
formation in the decision-making considerations of the
players
.
D. THE GAME ENVIRONMENT
The envisioned, fully-developed simulation contemplates
the extensive use of graphical computer support. The oppor-
tunity to display battlefield information graphically repre-
sents a significant command and control enhancement. Players
could visually observe the dynamics of the battlefield, and
could achieve an increased perception of the conflict
development. Within this environment, the variety and
detail of battlefield information can be uniquely presented
and its value subjectively determined. The development of
a fully-integrated, graphically-supported computer war game,
however, is an ambitious undertaking beyond the scope of
this work. Accordingly the current effort must first
emphasize creation of a structurally sound simulation
framework.
The logic development of the simulation presented in
this paper is designed to support a war game involving two
players, each positioned with a computer console and a
1:12,500 scale military topographic map of the battlefield
(superimposed with a hexagonal grid) . The players must
30

manually transfer the information received from the computer
to their maps, and then transmit their tactical orders to
the computer through the console (prompting is provided to
direct the necessary input requirements) . The computer
will only provide a narrowly determined and standardized
battlefield status report; this report provides sufficient
information with which to intelligently continue the battle
while maintaining a tempo-of-operations consistent with a
time-stressed environment. Reports of visual contacts of
enemy units will reach the players, and they will have to
decide, based on their assessment of the situation, whether
or not to engage these targets of opportunity. The players
will have complete freedom to maneuver their units and employ
their combat power at their discretion, consistent with
realistic terrain and weapon system limitations. Each
player is engaged against a thinking, mission-oriented, and
combat-capable adversary, and the element of risk is
pervasively maintained throughout the game. Enhancements
to the game play will concentrate on providing that battle-
field information the players believe will minimize their
risk level.
E. THE GAME FLOW
The game flow utilizes the concept of the 12-minute game
turn of the manual PEGASUS simulation. Each game turn
consists of an indirect fire phase, direct fire phase and
movement phase. The character of this structure, however,
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is significantly different from the manual PEGASUS game in
the respect that the two fire phases are completely executed
and resolved by the computer, rather than by a large number
of controllers. Embedded in the movement phase are the
intricate and dynamic interactions of target acquisition
and immediate engagement, as well as the "planning" phase
for indirect fire support and continuation of direct fires
for the next game turn.
Figure III.l provides a schematic of the relationship
of the logic routines developed to support this game flow.
Since each game turn represents a 12-minute portion of the
battle, the allocation of indirect fires, conduct of direct
fires and movement are all designed to be representative of
the pace of combat expected on the battlefield. Resolution
of these various aspects of combat is simplified by execut-
ing each game turn in the specified and orderly sequence of




. Indirect Fire Results Subroutine
This subroutine assesses the casualty and suppressive
effects of each executed artillery support fire mission on
the targeted unit. The effects of artillery fire are a
function not only of the intensity of fire brought to bear
on a target, but on the disposition and type of target.



























































































FIGURE III.l RELATIONSHIP OF GAME TURN SUBROUTINES
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to assessing conflict results on the target categories of
armored vehicles, troops in the offense, and troops in the
defense
.
2. Direct Fire Results Subroutine
Implicit in the execution of the direct fire engage-
ment procedures is the assumption that a unit will attack
a target with its most appropriate and potent weapon. For
example, an infantry unit equipped with an antitank missle
will use the missile when attacking a tank, but will use its
antipersonnel weapons when engaging troop targets. In this
regard embedded subroutines have been developed for casualty
assessments of two general target categories: armored
targets and dismounted troops. The casualty assessments
of armored targets utilizes cumulative probability distribu-
tions, based on uncoordinated attack assumptions, developed
in a special subroutine.
3. Movement Phase Subroutine
It is within the movement phase that the players
dynamically interact with the computer and each other. The
movement phase processes the following categories of
subroutines:
a. Movement Execution Subroutines
Subroutines have been developed to prioritize
the sequential movement of units (an effort to approximate
the simultaneous nature of events on the battlefield) , as
3^

well as to execute planned movements consistent with the
mobility constraints imposed "by terrain characteristics on
maneuver units. In this regard, each unit begins each turn
with an allowance of 12 movement minutes; these movement
minutes can be expended in several ways, principally in
movement, but also in direct fire operations. The cost in
movement minutes to move into an adjacent hex is a function
of the type of unit and the principal terrain characteristic
of that hex.
b. Target Detection Subroutines
Movement of any unit in the combat simulation
changes its detection probabilities relative to opposing
force units. The objective of this subroutine is twofold;
to determine if the moving unit has detected opposing forces,
and to determine if the moving unit has been detected by
opposing forces. Key to these objectives is the determina-
tion of line-of-sight between the units.
c. Immediate Fire Subroutines
Immediate exploitation of targets of opportunity
detected in the movement phase can be accomplished by the
organic direct fire assets of the observing unit, or by the
company's 81mm mortar platoon. Accordingly, subroutines
have been developed to provide for this capability. For
purposes of the simulation there are two types of direct
fire: deliberate fire and return fire. Direct fire missions
increase the probability of the firing unit being detected,





d. Close Assault Subroutine
Whereas direct fires are conducted at range,
close assaults are representative of close combat engage-
ments. Significant casualties result from these intense
engagements, and the attrition proportions are a probabilistic
function of the fire power ratios associated with the
corresponding attacker/defender. The close assault sub-
routine shows that a probabilistic advantage accrues to the
attacker, on the average, when the attacker-to-defender fire
power ratios exceed 2:1.
e. Planning Phase Subroutines
When all movements are exhausted and close
assaults resolved, the players then program their indirect
fires utilizing the artillery capabilities supporting the
battalion. If enemy forces are still observable, planned
deliberate direct fire missions can be scheduled. Most
importantly, the movements for each maneuver unit are pro-
grammed at this time, for execution during the next game
turn. This is the most time-consuming portion of the simula-
tion; however extensive computer prompting with time-clock
constraints on providing input will cause each player to
consider and execute his options in realistic time-frames.
F. SUBROUTINE DESIGN
The subroutines are designed to facilitate programming
efforts by follow-on studies, and major considerations have
been made and algorithms developed to simplify potential
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programming efforts. Particular emphasis has been placed
on developing the detailed logic for line-of-sight deter-
minations and for generating results of conflict engagements.
The levels of sophistication in these solutions are relatively
primitive, however they adequately satisfy the objectives
of the simulation.
Appendix A provides a glossary of the flowcharting
symbols used in the logic diagrams of each subroutine.
G. DATA BASE INPUT
Appendix B defines all the variables identified by the
subroutines presented in the following chapters. Of signifi-
cant concern is the development and input of representative
terrain information, to include the average elevation of
principal terrain characteristic of each hexagon. A battalion
level scenerio involving armored forces can be exercised in
a corridor 8 km's wide and 30 km's long. However, this
involves inputting elevation and terrain information for
6000 hexes, an effort that is not particularly motivating.
Accordingly, it will be desirable for the terrain over
which iterations of the war game is played to be a separate,
standardized input. Characteristics of the adversary forces,
including unit types, weapon mixes, and unit strengths, may
be easily adjusted for each game play.
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H. DATA BASE ORGANIZATION
In order to fully understand the logic presented in the
subroutine flowcharts to be presented, it is necessary that
the author's view of the data base organization be understood.
The actual organization to be utilized if the program were
to be executed would be dependent not only on the computer
hardware and software systems available, but also on the
judgement of the actual programmer.
The data used in the subroutines essentially fit into
three categories; unit-related, hex-related, and program-
related. The program-related variables involve look-up
tables, switches and counting mechanisms that are procedural
in nature and contribute to the programming effort. Hex-
related data refers primarily to the large table that
characterizes the terrain of the battlefield. The only
entrance to this table is the coordinates of each hex.
Accordingly, if it were desired to determine which hexes
were wooded, it would be necessary to test each hex in the
data base. It is important to understand that the location
of units, that is, a test of the occupancy of each hex,
cannot be accomplished utilizing this hex-related table. The
location of units, as well as all capability, disposition,
and vulnerability data, are accessible through tables organ-
ized with the unit code as the primary link. Accordingly,
when the logic of a routine requires that a specific hex
be tested for occupancy, the appropriate unit-location table
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is sequentially searched, with only the unit positions in
the table compared to the hex-coordinates in question. If
the specific unit is known, its location (and all other
unit-related data) can be directly accessed in the data
base via the unit code link.
I. CHANGE-OF -STATE PROCEDURES
The data base of the war game is predictably dynamic.
The movement of units and the resolution of conflict engage-
ments require many bookkeeping considerations in order to
correctly characterize the state of the battle.
The principal mechanism for introducing constraints on
units is through the time relationship of the game turn.
Since each game turn represents a "time-slice" of the battle,
the allocation of indirect fires, direct fires and control
of movement are all designed to be limited by game turn
allowances. Accordingly, the changes in the state of
variables associated with unit capabilities fall into 2
categories: those associated with the game turn (such as
movement minutes, effects index, and artillery response
capability) , which return to an initial value at the beginning
of each game turn; and those associated with the overall
game play (such as unit strength and location) which are
dynamically modified during the game turn, but are directly
carried to each succeeding game turn. Similarly, data items
associated with pending fire missions are directly transferred
in the data base to the next game turn.
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The processes involved for conduct of successful artillery
support of combat operations are multi -dimensional and complex;
however, the effective utilization of this dimension of
combat power will greatly influence the outcome of any
engagement. Accordingly it is necessary that the indirect
fire support processes incorporated in the model be representa-
tive of existing military capabilities and constraints, and
that the war game players have sufficient information and
latitude to exercise this capability to enhance their combat
effectiveness. This objective is clearly constrained by the
parallel objective to make as much of the combat process
as transparent to the player as possible, while still main-
taining a time-constraining stress environment.
B. EMPLOYMENT OF INDIRECT FIRES
Prior to commencement of game play, it is necessary to
input into the data base an artillery "response capability"
for both adversaries participating in the exercise. This
response capability is a numerical value which represents
the maximum capability for artillery fires to support each
side each game turn . The maximum sustained-rate-of-fire of
each artillery weapon has served as the basis for determining
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this response capability, and accordingly it is reflective
of both the 12 minute per turn time -constraint and the real-
world employment constraint.
The total response capability available to each side is
based on the artillery organization for combat generated in
the supporting game scenerio. Field artillery is organized
for combat by the assignment of one of the four standard
tactical missions (direct support, reinforcing, general
support-reinforcing, general support) to each artillery
battalion. The support relationship represented by these
mission assignments is from artillery battalion to combat
brigade (or regimental) units. Accordingly each maneuver
battalion within a brigade will normally have available to
it only a portion of the fire power of the supporting artillery
unit, as noted in Table IV. 1.
TABLE IV.
1
ARTILLERY RESPONSE CAPABILITY CONTRIBUTIONS
Artillery Mission Response Capability Contribution
PEGASUS Simulation
Direct Support 12 2
*Direct Support, Priority




General Support 9 1.5
k.2 inch Mortars 8 1.5
* If the maneuver battalion has priority of fire, the direct
support artillery battalion contributes larger value (30 vice 12,
or 5 vice 2) to the response capability.

Table IV. 1 also includes a contribution in response capability
by the maneuver battalions h.2 inch mortar platoon. Accord-
ingly a maneuver battalion in a Brigade sized unit supported
by one direct support artillery battalion, one reinforcing
artillery battalion, and two battalions in general support,
would have a response capability of 7 contributed by these
units (2 + 2 + 1.5 + 1.5)« By adding the maneuver battalions
k.2" mortar capability, its total response capability becomes
8.5.
The number of fire missions available to a player during
each game turn therefore is constrained by the organization
for combat of the artillery, and will vary based on the num-
ber of volleys, or intensity, associated with each fire
mission he requests. The "cost" of each mission is shown in
Table IV. 2. The "cost" of each mission fired is subtracted
from the artillery response capability until the response
capability has been expended or until all requests for fire
have been satisfied. It is noted that unexpended portions




MISSION RESPONSE FACTORS FOR INDIRECT FIRES












C. PLAYER INPUT REQUIREMENTS
As outlined above, the indirect artillery support avail-
able to each player has been generalized to simplify its
use while still providing the "commander" control over these
assets. No fire support mission will be fired unless it is
initiated by the players. The players input their indirect
fire support requests at the end of each game turn in accor-
dance with the prompting directions provided by the computer
terminal. The player is asked if he requires any indirect
fire support; a positive answer then generates computer
queries requesting the target hex coordinates and the in-
tensity of fire power desired to be brought to bear at the
target location. Figure IV. 1 charts the interactive nature
of the indirect fire support input. Note that the requests
made in this subroutine will be executed at the beginning
of the subsequent game turn, and that the results of these
fires can modify the planned movement and direct fire
capabilities of the opposing player, as well as cause
casualties
.
D. ASSESSMENT OF INDIRECT FIRE RESULTS
The procedures for assessing indirect fire results are
based on simplifying assumptions relative to the combat
results tables of the PEGASUS manual game. There are
separate indirect fire combat results tables for U.S. and
























This subroutine details the procedures
for requesting indirect artillery
fire support missions.
The artillery response
available prior to ass
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Mission costs are a function of the
intensity of fire of the mission.
Costs associated with each intensity
are found in Table IV. 2.
If costs exceed the available response
capability, the mission request cannot
be executed during the next game turn.
Artillery availability, although
exceeded in this request, might still
be sufficient to support a lower








target category. Figure IV. 2 reproduces the results table
for the U.S. vs. dismounted troops in the offense. Casualties
are determined by first searching for the table with the
appropriate artillery round caliber (i.e., 155 mm, 175 nun,
105 mm); once finding the correct table, the intensity of
fire requested for the mission and the size of the target
(squad, platoon, or company) will determine which box within
the matrix applies. There are six digits in each block,
each corresponding to the results of a die roll. Accordingly,
for a 155 nun mission of moderate intensity against a platoon
sized unit, a die roll of 5 would determine results of 1
killed-in-action (KIA)
, 5 wounded-in-action (WIA) , and an
effects index of 3 (the effects indexes will be described
shortly; they range from no effect (1), to complete
disruption (4) )
.
There are separate tables for the U.S. and opposing
forces, and the tables are further identified by target





2. Dismounted troops - defense
3« Dismounted troops - offense
4. Fire Support Systems
5- Troops in Rear Areas
Superimposed upon these target categories are separate re-
sults tables based on groupings of artillery calibers - an
average of 3 tables per target category, and a resulting
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total of approximately 30 different tables to search for
combat results. The intricacies involved in attempting to
develop algorithms to duplicate just one of these tables
is sufficiently frustrating to encourage the search for




Reduction of Target Categories
The scope of the interactive war game is essentially
limited to maneuver elements of the combat forces. In order
to minimize the decision processes the player must concentrate
on to fight the battle, the movement of fire support systems
has been made transparent (assumed to be doctrinally consis-
tent with the movement of maneuver elements) . Considerations
relating to troops in rear areas have been assumed to be a
concern of the Brigade echelons of command, and accordingly
are not played at the Battalion level to which this simula-
tion is addressed. In view of these considerations it is
consistent to exclude "fire support systems" and "troops in
rear areas" from the list of target categories.
2. Consolidation of Tables
A review of Figure IV. 2 provides a number of in-
sights that can be generalized for all of the indirect
fire combat results tables. First, it is noted that the
effects index is not a function of caliber, but rather of
intensity of fire. Clearly this is consistent with the

realities of combat; an infantryman is not concerned with
the caliber of an incoming round - he will seek cover and
protection directly in accordancd with the intensity of
fire, the number of rounds per minute, that land in his
vicinity, and his movement and firepower will be proportion-
ately suppressed. Second, when corresponding row/column
blocks are compared between the two tables, it is noted that
the range of casualties are essentially equivalent, and
that only the probability distribution of casualties appears
to be influenced by the increase in caliber. Accordingly,
with both casualties and effects more heavily influenced by
intensity of fire rather than by caliber of rounds utilized,
the consolidation of these tables appears prudent and reason-
able, as little loss in generality occurs.
3- Casualty Considerations
Since the war game as currently envisioned does not
play evacuation processes for WIA's, nor does it play the
administration/logistics considerations of personnel and
equipment replacements, there is no utility for keeping
bookkeeping notes on WIA's. Clearly, however, there is an
inverse relationship between the number of men wounded in
a unit and the unit's combat power. Since loss of manpower
(KIA's) also reduces combat power, the conversion of WIA's
was converted to equivalent KIA's on a 2 for 1 basis. The
resulting equivalent KIA's were added to the actual KIA
^7

totals, and casualty tables now expressed in only KIA totals
were developed. Figure IV. 3 was developed using this approach
on the 155 nun results table depicted in figure IV. 2. These
resulting tables then served as the basis for regression
analysis efforts to generate algorithms for determining
personnel casualties.
E. CASUALTY TABLE RELATIONSHIPS
An analysis of the PEGASUS personnel casualty tables
provides useful observations. As would reasonably be ex-
pected given a specific level of intensity of fire, casualties
increased as the size of the target increased (from squad
to platoon to company sized targets) . However, this increase
was not proportional to the actual increase in size of the
target. Whereas the proportional size of a squad: platoon:
company is l:3*9i the proportional casualty increases are
approximately 1:2:4 (as found in the PEGASUS tables). This
apparent inconsistency is easily explained: as the size of
the unit increases, the area within which it is dispersed
increases; accordingly, if the same number of rounds are
used in a mission against these targets, its area of coverage
must either be increased (resulting in a lower intensity of
fire per unit area, and hence lower probability of kill); or
if its area of coverage is not increased, a proportion of
the larger target is not threatened, resulting in propor-
tionately fewer kills. Within this context, the 1:2:4 re-
lationship is understandable and of utility.
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KIA 000 000 000 011 001 111
111 112
MMA 000 111 011 112 111 234
MODERATE
KIA 000 001 000 111 011 112
112 334
WIA 001 121 111 134 123 457
HEAVY
KIA 000 111 •Oil 112 111 123
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KIA 000 112 111 122 112 233
333 444















000 001 001 111 111 122
112 334
WIA 011 122 112 455 345 678
HEAVY




111 123 123 467 346 789
INTENSE
KIAJ 000 112 111 222 122 233
333 444












LIGHT J 000011 001122 01233**
MODERATE I 000112 01233^ 233^56
HEAVY 001122 1223^5 235567











LIGHT 000000 OOOlU 011223
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Similarly, as the intensity of fire on equal sized
targets increases, casualties are expected to increase. This
is in fact observed in the PEGASUS results tables. As the
level of intensity of fire is increased from light to medium
to heavy to intense, casualties proportionally increase
approximately in the ratio 1:2:3*^» respectively, (Referring
back to Table IV. 2., the mission costs for increasing levels
of intensity also increased in the same 1:2:3 -^ ration. This
similarity in ratios is a useful property which can be ex-
ploited when developing computer coding)
.
F. CASUALTY ALGORITHM
The logic governing how casualties will increase as the
intensity of fire increases and as the number of personnel
in the target area increases has been quantified in the
previous discussion. These relationships were exploited in
the development of a generalized personnel casualty algorithm
The tables constructed based on the procedures in para-
graph IV. D. 3 were analyzed, and it was noted that the mean
KIA value in any casualty distribution grouping (associated
with the outcome of a possible die roll could be approximated
by the product of the intensity of fire and the size of the
target. Using an index for intensity of fire of 1:2*3*^
to describe the relationship between light : moderate : heavy
:
intense, and an index for target unit size of 1:2:3 for the
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squad: platoon: company relationship, the mean KIA value against
dismounted troops in the offense is approximated by:
KIA(I.T) = 0.5 x I x T (IV-1)
where
I = intensity of fire index
T = target size index
The associated index values are found in Tables IV.
3
and IV. 4.
TABLE IV. 3 INTENSITY OF FIRE INDEX VALUES, I





TABLE IV. k TARGET SIZE INDEX VALUES, T




Extending this relationship to other weapon systems and to.
other target dispositions (troops in defense) requires a
modifier to each of these indexes; the relationship then
becomes: / TV ? \
where
KIA(I,T) = 0.5 x k- x I x kT x T
kj = weapons system intensity factor
k™ = target disposition factor
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For purposes of this discussion, kj = 1.0 for artillery fires,
and kT takes the value of 1.0 for troops in the offense, or
0.5 for troops in the defense. Further development of these
factors is found in paragraph VI. 4, where they are applied
to generalize direct fire casualty results.
Equation IV-2 only describes the average number of KIA's
expected for each weapon-target pairing. In order to provide
for an appropriate range of stochastic outcomes, a uniform
distribution was assumed, and the following relationships
were determined:
X = 0.5(^1 + kmT)(R - .5) + KIA(I,T) (IV-3)
where




_ X when X>.0 (IV-4)KIA(I,T,R) -
when X<Q
In equation IV-3, the (k,I + kmT)/2 term represents the
relative range of values that X can assume around the mean
value KIA. Equations IV-3 and IV-4, used in conjunction with
integer rounding properties available in computer calculations,
provides for casualty distributions that adequately attrited
infantry forces within the context of the envisioned inter-
active war game. Figure IV -4 is an example of the results
obtained using the algorithm. The relationships are clearly
approximate, and although useful in their presented form,
can easily be further refined if desired. The overall
procedure utilized for determining indirect fire casualties







This subroutine assesses the
casualty and suppressive effects
of each executed indirect













The first step in assessing results
is to determine if in fact a unit
is occupying the target hexi if
there is no unit currently occupying
the hex. there can be no casualties.
Note that all units are checked. It






























Generate a uniformly distributed
random number, R, such that












This subroutine assesses the effects
of indirect artillery fire upon
armored targets.
The category "armored" includes








































This subroutine assesses the casualty
and suppressive effects of indirect
artillery fire upon troops in the
defence.
A unit i3 considered in a defensive























E is defined as the
Effects Indexi see
Table IV. 5 for
descriptions.





A position in a "covering*
hex reduces the casualty
effects of an artillery
mission (but not the
suppression effects).
For a mission of light
intensity into a covered







For artillery fire against troops in
defense, lc, = l.O, k_=0.5. and equation
IV-3 becomes
i
x = 0.5(I+.5T)(R-0.5) + 0.25IT
. ...
, f x when x > 1and KIA = i ,-, ^ n r
I when x -
J
where
T = Tarret size Index of uniti
soe Table IV. 1*.
I = Intensity Index of fire
missioni see Table IV. 3-
R ='?<andom number (OiR£l)
FIGURE IV.
7
FLOWCHART OF INDIRECT FIRE RESULTS (TROOPS IN DEFENSE) SUBROUTINE
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This subroutine assesses the casualty
and suppressive effects of indirect
artillery fire upon troops in the
offense.
E is defined as the
Effects Index i see
Table IV. 5 for
descriptions.





A position in a "covering"
hex reduces the casualty
effects of an artillery
mission (but not the
suppression effects).
For a mission of light
intensity into a covered
hex there will be no
effects.
For artillery fire against troops in















Target Size Index of uniti
see Table IV. 4.
Intensity Index of fire





In addition to creating casualties, indirect artillery
fires will also degrade a units combat power and movement
capabilities. This degradation is accounted for in the
PEGASUS game by use of an "effects index." The effects
indexes are defined in Table IV. 5.
TABLE IV.
5
DESCRIPTIONS OF EFFECTS INDEXES
Effects Index Description
1 No Effect
2 Combat power degraded $0% for
balance of turn
3 Combat power and movement de-
graded 50$ for balance of
turn
4 Unit is disrupted; it may not
move nor conduct direct fire
for the balance of turn;
its close assault factor is
decreased by 75% for the
remainder of turn.
The extent of a units suppression is directly related to the
intensity of fire of the artillery mission. The more intense
the fire mission, the more severe the probability of suppres-
sion. Similarly, a unit which has established a defensive
posture would not suffer the degree of suppressive effects
accorded to a unit in an offensive posture. These considera-
tions are appropriately accounted for in the determination
of effects as depicted in Figures IV. 5 - IV-8. It is noted
that the threshold values used in determining applicable
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effects indexes are those utilized in the related PEGASUS
combat results tables.
The results of the effects on the targeted unit is best
explained by an example. An effects index of three, as
described in Table IV-5» specifies that the targeted unit's
combat power and movement are reduced by 50f° for the balance
of the turn. Accordingly, the results of any of the targeted
units direct fires are reduced by one-half, the units close
assault factor is reduced by one-half, and only six movement
minutes are available to the unit for that turn.
Figure IV. 9 provides a flowchart of the procedures
utilized to change a unit's capabilities when it has been
suppressed by fire during a game turn. These procedures are
followed in each instance when the subroutines indicate that





This procedure is followed
whenever the data base is
updated to reflect changes
created by the suppressive




















Setting movement minutes to
tero effectively restricts the
unit from moving and from
conducting direct fires for















It is through the simulation of time and space that the
interaction of opposing forces and their environment can be
accounted for. Germane to this interaction is the ability
for opposing forces to detect each other, to execute sur-
veillance and target acquisition. Surveillance and target
acquisition have a pervasive influence on other aspects of
combat models: they provide the basis upon which commanders
make decisions about allocation of forces, about movement,
and about firepower itself. Therefore, it is extremely im-
portant that observation probabilities be adequately repre-
sented in any combat model.
B. TARGET ACQUISITION
As previously discussed, the direct fire phase is depen-
dent upon observation being established by the firing unit
of the targeted unit. This ability to observe occurs only
when a line-of-sight exists between the two units, and is
further dependent upon the distance between the two units,
the disposition of the opposing unit (i.e., moving, stationary),
as well as appropriate terrain factors. The opportunity




The PEGASUS game established maximum distances to which
observation may exist, as shown in Table V.l:
TABLE V.l
PEGASUS MAXIMUM OBSERVATION DISTANCES
Status Disposition of Observed Unit
of
Observing Unit Stationary Moving
Dismounted 1000 m 2000 m
Mounted 2000 m 4-000 m
These distances then represent the limiting conditions within
which observation can occur. It must be emphasized at this
point that these constraints are unique to the PEGASUS game,
and that the maximum observation distances used in wargaming
simulations is uniquely inconsistent in the literature. Ir-
respective of the lack of precision of the maximum distances
of Table V.l, they adequately serve to establish an influence
within the game play between the dynamics of the tactical
situation (fire and maneuver) and the ability of a unit to
obtain information (target acquisition)
.
C. LINE-OF-SIGHT PROBLEM FORMULATION
The ability to observe another unit visually only occurs
when an uninterrupted line-of-sight exists between the two
units. The problem can be easily defined: knowing the
three dimensional location in space of each unit, project a
line between the two points and test if any obscuring
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elements in three dimensional space intercept the line. If
there are no obscuring elements on the path, line-of-sight
exists.
D. MODEL IMPLICATIONS
The ability to execute this test within the model assump-
tions and constraints is disarmingly nontrivial. According-
ly, a review of some of these restrictions and their




Uniformity of Elevation in Hex
The input of the elevation of each hex in the data
base is determined by averaging the actual elevations on the
topographic map from within the particular hex. For example,
the terrain on the side of uniformly sloping hill may vary
in elevation within a hex from 200 meters at its highest
point to 180 meters at its lowest. The average value of
190 meters would be input to represent the uniform eleva-
tion of the hex in the data base . Each hexagon would be
defined with a single and uniform elevation.
2. Uniformity of Terrain Features
Those terrain features that dominate the terrain
within a hexagon are assumed to characterize all of the
hexagon. Each hex is characterized by only one terrain
feature (cleared, wooded, built-up area, etc.) which is
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appropriately input into the data base. This terrain
characteristic is assumed, then, to exist uniformly through-
out the hex. As an example, the topographic features of a
standard hex may be partially wooded (25%), but the dominate
feature is that of cleared terrain. The computer model will
treat the hexagon as uniformly clear for all visibility and
movement calculations.
3- The Irregular Hexagon
The PEGASUS control board superimposes a hexagon
grid pattern over a standard military topographic map, and
utilizes the hexes as the basic position identifying elements
It would be desirable, from a mathematical and analytic
standpoint, that this be a regular hexagon grid system.
However, this feature cannot be accomodated because of the
requirement to conform to the existing military map grid-
square geometry. To simplify location reporting, it is
desirable that the center of each of the 25 hexes in a
grid square be represented within the grid square by a pair
of single digit numbers coinciding with their actual map
coordinates. This cannot be achieved with a regular hexagon
system; if the vertical distance between the centers of two
regular hexagons is fixed at 200 meters, the horizontal
balance between the centers of regular hexagons becomes
200cos30 meters, vice 200 meters, and is clearly not com-
patible with a simple location reporting system.
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Figure V.l summarizes the properties of the PEGASUS
hexagon utilized as the basic element in the computer simu-
lation. It is noted in figure V.l that the distance between
the diagonal faces of the hexagon and its center is 110. 9^
meters, vice the 100 meters between the horizontal faces and
the center. This information becomes useful in the line-
of-sight determination, as will be explained further in
the chapter. Figure V.l provides information uniquely
relevant to the development of line-of-sight algorithms.
Attention is drawn to the fact that the slope of the line
SY connecting the centers of 2 diagonally adjacent hexagons
is defined by:
tan - g§§ - -500
The geometry of the hexagon then also dictates that the lines
ABC and DEF also have this same slope. The importance of
these factors will be developed shortly.
E. LINE-OF -SIGHT DETERMINATION
Since all units are assumed to be "concentrated" at the
center of each hexagon, determination of line-of-sight be-
tween these units logically dictates that a straight line
be drawn between the centers of those hexes representing
their positions. All hexes in between these two points
into which the projected line crosses must therefore be
checked for obscuring properties. If no hexes are found to
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FIGURE V.l
GEOMETRIC PROPERTIES OF THE PEGASUS HEXAGON
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conversely, if obscuration is found, line-of-sight , and
hence observation, does not exist.
In a continuum where every point is represented in the
data base, this checking procedure would be straightforward.
However, with only one data point to represent the terrain
for every ^0,000 square meters (the area of a hex) the pro-
cedure is less direct.
The determination of which hexes are intercepted by the
projected line between units is complicated by the irregularity
of the hexagon element. The projected line can be easily
defined by the equation of a straight line of the form:
y = mx + b (V-l)
where







b = y 2
- mx
2
when (x-, y-) represent the hex grid coordinates of unit 1,
and (x
2 , y2 ) represents the position of unit 2. Graphically,
knowing the coordinates of position 1 and 2, it is a simple
matter to connect the points with a line, to visually deter-
mine which hexes have been intercepted, and then to test
these hexes for obscuring properties. From an analytical
viewpoint the problem is more pronounced. When a line with
a known slope = m passes through the center of a hex, it
is a straightforward matter to determine the side, and hence
the adjacent hex, which the line will intercept. However,
if all that is known is the slope of the line, the problem
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of determining where the line will exit, and hence which
adjacent hex it will next intercept, confronts us. Whereas
there are a variety of ways to approach this problem analyt-
ically, the procedure developed below has the advantages of
being straightforward and mathematically uncomplicated.
It is first noted that the slope of a line and its
directional properties (positive x-y, positive x-negative y,
etc.) determines the quadrant pattern of adjacent hexes
which must be checked along the path of the line. For
example, a positive slope in the positive x-y direction
dictates the set of the vertically and diagonally adjacent
hexes that must always be checked, as shown in figure V.2.
Figures V.3 and V.^ display that quadrant pattern of
adjacent hexes associated with aline with a positive slope
in the positive X-Y direction. Hexes 1,2, and 3 are the
only hexes into which a line so defined can enter upon
leaving hex A. The shaded area of figure V.3 represents
the loci of all possible lines of slope less than or equal
to 0.5 which exit from hex A. The significant factor to
observe is that all lines (m —0.5) which enter hex 1 first
must still intercept hex 2; further, there also exists a
family of lines which enter hex 3 t>ut do not intersect
hex 2. Accordingly, it can be concluded that any line of




FIGURE V.2 QUADRANT PATTERN OF ADJACENT HEXES
slope S 0.5
FIGURE V.3
LOCUS OF LINES OF SLOPE LESS THAN 0.5 EXITING HEXAGON
slope > 0.5
FIGURE V.^
LOCUS OF LINES OF SLOPE GREATER THAN 0.5 EXITING HEXAGON
68

Similarly, observation of figure V.^ shows that any
line of slope > 0.5 which did not enter hex 2 must have always
entered hex 1
.
A method to test whether or not a line has intercepted
a hex is by the calculation of the perpendicular distance
between the line and center of the hex. If it is within
predetermined threshold values (dictated by the geometry
of the hexagon) it can be concluded that the line has inter-
cepted the hex.
The calculation of the distance between a point (x-, y.)
and as line y = mx + b is defined by the formula:
mx
1
- y 1 + b
distance = —±-5—- (V-2)
nT + 1
Referring back to figure V.l, the threshold values to test
against are determined to be 100 meters when m ^ 0.5i and
111 meters when m>0.5^
Accordingly, the logic for determining which of the
adjacent hexes a line exiting a hex will enter has evolved.
The decision process is depicted in figure V.5» and is ex-
plained as follows:
1. Knowing the directional slope of the line determines
the quadrant set of hexes which must always be checked.
2. The diagonally oriented hex (hex-2 in the example)
is first checked to determine if it has been intercepted.
If it was not intercepted, a test of the slope of the line
























































FLOWCHART FOR DETERMINING LINE PATH THROUGH ADJACENT HEXES
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3. The fact that the diagonally oriented hex was inter-
cepted does not preclude its intercepting another hex. Again,
the geometry of the situation governs the procedure: if the
slope is greater than 0.5. only the vertically oriented
hex need he checked; if less than 0.5 only the horizontally
oriented hex must be checked.
k. If two hexes have been intercepted, it remains to be
determined which of the pair the line exited from last (for
that hex will be the reference hex for the next iteration
of checks) . The geometry again governs the decision: for
a slope less than 0.5 the line intercepting both the horizon-
tal and diagonally adjacent hexes will always exit from the
diagonally adjacent hex last; for a slope greater than 0.5.
the line intercepting both the diagonally and vertically
adjacent hexes will always exit from the vertical hex last.
F. DETERMINATION IF HEX IS OBSCURING HEX
Upon determining that a hex is on the map path of the
projected line-of-sight between two units, it is necessary
to determine if the elevation of the hex intercepts the
three-dimensional path. The mathematics of this effort is
significantly simplified when the three-dimensional path
is projected onto a two-dimensional plane, as shown in
figure V.6. Based on the map direction of the line (slope
greater than 0.5) it may be more convenient to work in the














decision is made the appropriate slope ( for the XZ or













Y2 " Y l X 2 " X l
Knowing the elevation Z-, and adding to it the height of an
erect man in meters, the determination of the line-of-sight























G. DETERMINATION OF OBSCURING ELEVATION OF HEX
The elevation and the terrain characteristics of any
hex on the map path must be extracted from the data base
in order to determine the obscuring elevation of the hex.
The only terrain features that represent obscuring properties
in the model are wooded areas and built-up areas. Accord-
ingly, once the identity of a map path hex is known, that
hex is tested for the presence of obscuring properties
(which have been assumed unfiorm throughout all of the hex)
.
A positive test indicates that the elevation of the hex
must be appropriately increased (the model uses a height
of 8 meters for wooded areas and 12 meters for built up
areas) . It should be noted this calculated obscuring
elevation is that of the center-of-mass of the hex; this
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height, using the center of the hex as the reference, is
then projected upon the XZ or YZ plane (as appropriate) for
testing for obscuration. This approach has the advantage
of partially smoothing out the "stepped" terrain of the
computer model (see figure V.7).
H. DETERMINATION OF OBSCURATION
The test for obscuration therefore becomes simple. A
comparison of the elevation of the projected line of sight
is made against the obscuring elevation of the hex. If
obscuration exist, line-of -sight between the two units does
not exist. If the hex is not an obscuring hex, the logic
developed in this chapter is repeated, i.e., determining the
next set of hexes on the map path, and checking them for
obscuration. This procedure is graphically summarized in
figure V.8. The model logic is summarized in figure V.9«
I. DETECTION: GENERAL
Line-of -sight determination, however, is embedded within
the larger question of whether or not detection in fact
occurs. The theory of detection indicates that the contrast
of the target, the atmospheric attenuation, the angular
motion, the experience of the observer, fatigue, camouflage
of the target, and a host of other factors are important in
detection phenomenon. The level of detail required to


























































Thi3 subroutine determines whether
or not an unobstructed line-of-sight
exists between two units.
Within this procedure, the moving unit
,is again referred to as unit M, and
the opposing unit is referred to as 0.
The specific unit against which this
subroutine checks has been selected
by the Detection Subroutine.




&elev is defined as the incremental
elevation change with respect
to the XZ or YZ plane
Aelev(XZ) elev17ttf - elev(M)
AeleWYZ) - elev(O) - elev(M)^ ev(Y |y(0) - yU)\
This procedure tests the direction-
al properties of the line under
consideration. As discussed in
paragraph V. E. the directional
properties of the line will dictate
the adjacent quadrant set of hexes
which must be tested for intercep-
tion.
Accordingly, a test is made for
positive x-direction and positive
y direction, with the results of
the tpst establishing values of
constants that will be utilized to
calculate the coordinates of adja-
cent hexes to be checked (relative
to the "case" hex).
The moved unit's new location













































Knowing the slope of the
line and its direction, we
can then calculate the co-
ordinates of the adjacent
hexes which need to be tested
to determine if they are
intercepted by the line.
Note that the first hex to
be tested will always be
the diagonally adjacent




In order to test whether
or not the line has inter-
cepted a hex, the perpen-
dicular distance between
the point and the line is
calculated. If the distance
is within thresnold values,
the line is contained in
the hex.
The distance between a
line y«mx+b and a point





Note, that the order. for
checking the hexes is impor-
tant; the diagonally adjacent
hex is always checked first}
if the line is not contained
in the diagonal nex, it is
always contained in the 2d
test hex.
If the line M
then becomes




















rough both hexes, it
determine which of
exit from. This
n 'order to determine
set of "test hexes".
represents the
for cases when the
e diagonal hex serves









Only wooded or built-up area terrain
hexes have potential obscuring proper-
ties. If the test hexes have obscuring
properties their elevations are increased
as follows
i
for wooded terrain hex=elevation *8 (meters)






The projected line-of-sight elevation
for each hex is determined by utilizing
the incremental elevation changes cal-
culated earlier. The height of an





elev(M) is the elevation
of the hex of the moving
unit, and
Aelev represents the
product of the incremental
change and the associated
x or y axis distance that











with the level of detail at which our model is "being pursued.
The framework for the detection simulation includes line-of-
sight existence, whether or not the target or the observer
is moving, the characteristics of the target unit (size,
equipment), all bounded by maximum observable distances.
These factors all contribute to a probability of detection
that therefore must take into account all of the non-explicit
factors.
J. DETECTION DETERMINATION
Any change in the location of any unit in the combat
simulation changes its detection probabilities relative to
opposing force units. Accordingly keying of a detection
subroutine is required after every movement of any unit from
its hex location in the data base to another adjacent hex.
The moved unit becomes the focal point for the calculation
of ranges between it and all opposing units. The objective
of the subroutine is twofold:
1. To determine if the moving unit has changed its
status of observation of opposing units.
2. To determine if the moving unit has changed its
status of observation by_ opposing units.
Key to these objectives is the determination of line-of-sight
,
or intervisibility . Intervisibility and detection are assumed,
without calculation, between observers and targets in adjacent
hexagons. Observation and detection cannot occur, in accor-
dance with the game thresholds, when the distance between
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she units becomes excessive. For those situations of interest
between these two extremes, the logic of figure V.10 deter-
mines whether or not detection occurs. If line-of-sight
exists between two units, the probability of detection is
calculated as a decreasing function of the distance between
;he units. It must be noted that two different detection
leterminations are being made within the logic diagram:
letection of the moved unit by opposing forces (detection
)f moving units involves longer detection threshold distances)
,
md detection by the moved unit of opposing stationary forces
[at shorter threshold distances) . The probability of
letection is considerably enhanced for either unit in the
ilgorithm if line-of-sight had existed between the units
Drior to the event under consideration. Clearly, the longer
i unit is within line-of-sight, the higher the probability
Lt will be detected. Although the algorithm reflecting this
Logic is subjectively developed, it provides useful informa-
bion. Similarly, if observation of a unit had previously
existed, that observation is determined to be continued if
Line-of-sight continues to exist.
C. POTENTIAL ENHANCEMENTS
The procedures presented represent target acquisition
processes for essentially a one-sensor system, that of
/isual contact. Most direct fire weapons have low trajectories
:losely approximating projected line-of-sights, and accord-

























The Detection Subroutine is called
after every movement of a unit.
The subroutine determines whether
the moving unit has observed any
adversary forces, and whether the
moving unit ha3 been detected by any
adversary forces.
For notational simplicity, the
moving unit is referred to as M,
and the opposing unit as 0,.
Maximum observable distances are
found in Table V.l.
If a unit moves into a hex adjacent
to an opposing unit, intervisibility
automatically occurs irrespective of
























id the hex checking
e if constraints
line-of-sight from
If both units are within obscuring
hexes, or outside of observable
range, no visual contact will result
















The probability of observation is a
function of the distance between the
units in relation to their maximum
observation distances!




If observation between units existed
previous to the current movement, then
observation continues to exist.
P( observation | observation existed) = 1
If line-of-sight existed previously,
but observation didn't, the probability
of observation is still enhanced.
P(observ|LOS existed) = I 3(l-P(observ))5
1 isThe random number between and
compared to the probability of
observation to determine is visual




be relevant in the foreseeable future. Clearly, however,
sophisticated, specialized radars, electro-optical seekers,
aerial reconnaissance drones and electronic intelligence
capabilities, offer exotic new target acquisition opportunities
The operational characteristics of these new sensor systems
can be readily incorporated into the simulation structure,
and their influences evaluated subjectively.
Most interactive war games, and PEGASUS is no exception,
provide perfect information about an adversary unit once
it is detected. Location, unit size, and unit capabilities,
are all known once the threshold of detection is overcome.
This rarely occurs in battle. The stress and urgency of
combat pervasively causes uncertainty; misperceptions and
miscalculations - and this perverbial "fog of war" clouds
all operational decisions. Accordingly, as development of
envisioned war game progresses, the opportunity to study
the effects of misinformation presents itself. This factor
of misinformation will not lose it's influence in an automated
battlefield. The quality or accuracy of all sensor informa-
tion is highly variable, and is a function of the source
and inherent environmental considerations. However, these
variables become transparent as data undergoes transformation
into aggregated computerized information. All traces of
their questionable ancestry are forgotton, and an aura of
respectability (and accuracy) is generated. The concern
that surfaces is at what level of misinformation will the




The influence of the "fog of war," of misinformation,
can "be incorporated into the simulation. Once detection
has been ascertained, the accuracy of the reported location
and size of the observed unit can become subject to stochastic
processes. As the distance between the observed and detected
unit increases, the accuracy of the reported location may
become less accurate; similarly, the accuracy of the estimate
of the unit size should decrease. The accuracy of an obser-
vation report from a unit that is being suppressed by fire
would suffer in accuracy. Accuracy degradation would take
the form of changing a units reported location between 1 to 5
hexes along the axis of the line-of-sight between the 2 units.
The use of smoke as an obscuring capability under the
control of the players is another potential enhancement
which would improve the realism of the game. Use of smoke
missions would expend artillery capability, and last only
during one game turn. However, the targeted hex would
become an obscuring hex during line-of-sight determinations,
hence protecting against detection. This capability was
not developed in order to simplify the role of the player
as much as possible in the game; however, once the game is
established, the use of smoke could be incorporated.
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VI. DIRECT FIRE ENGAGEMENTS
A. GENERAL
Once target acquisition has been accomplished, the
direct interaction of the forces can be initiated and
accounted for. Of course, target acquisition does not re-
quire target engagement; clearly, the role of the successful
commander includes a selective decision process relative to
when, where, or whether to engage a target. His decision
will be based, in part, on his mission objectives, his
environment, his fire power capabilities, as well as his
perception of his adversaries objectives and capabilities.
Once he has made the decision to engage a target, time and
distance factors will influence the probability of his
success. The purpose of this section will be to describe
the considerations and interactions that occur once the
decision to engage a target has occurred.
B. DIRECT FIRE ENGAGEMENT RULES
Actual combat activities occur simultaneously and con-
tinuously on a real battlefield. The dynamics of battle
are exceedingly intricate and interactive, and accordingly
in attempting to present direct fire engagements in real
time within the context of the war game, it is not possible
to account for all possible variables and outcomes of an
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engagement. Consequently, the PEGASUS war game includes a
number of rules and restrictions which are designed to keep
direct fire solutions fairly simple and straight-forward,





Perhaps the most important of the restrictions is
the trade-off between a unit's ability to move and a unit's
capability to execute direct fire during the same game turn.
For each direct fire mission, the firing unit forfeits a
portion of its movement allowance, thereby degrading its
ability to move. Conversely, a unit which moves may degrade
its ability to conduct direct fire during the movement phase.
Each direct fire mission costs the firing unit three move-
ment minutes. Because a direct fire mission can be executed
during either the direct fire phase or the movement phase
of a game turn, there is a requirement to assure that suf-
ficient unexpended movement minutes are available to a unit
prior to execution of the mission.
2. Deliberate and Return Fire
For purposes of the simulation there are two types
of direct fire: deliberate fire and return fire. Deliberate
fire is that direct fire which a unit plans and executes as
the initiating fire in an engagement. Return fire is direct
fire that a unit delivers on an opposing unit in response
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to fire received from that unit. Return fire is reactive in
nature and generally less effective than deliberate fire,
and accordingly the distinction between the two types of
fire must be accounted for prior to assessing the results of
a direct fire mission. In this regard, when direct fires
are planned by opposing units against each other for execution
during the direct fire phase, both fires are considered
"deliberate" and are assumed to occur simultaneously.
3- Restrictions on Number of Missions
Although there a 12 movement minutes available, a
unit is restricted to executing a maximum of three direct
fire missions during a game turn. Further, no unit may fire
more than one direct fire mission at the same target during
the same phase (direct fire phase or movement phase) of a
game turn.
k. Observation
As clearly emphasized in previous sections, a unit
must have line-of-sight to a target before it can engage
that target by direct fire. During the direct fire phase,
a unit may fire at any target it can observe, or any target
that becomes observable during that phase. When a unit
executes a direct fire mission from within an obscuring
hex, it reduces the obscuring protection the terrain affords,
and increases the probability of its observation and detection,
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If a firing unit becomes "observable" to the targeted unit,
the targeted unit may execute a "return" fire mission in
response.
C. PLAYER REQUESTS FOR DIRECT FIRE MISSIONS
Consistent with the interactive and dynamic nature of
combat, exploitable targets may be opportunistically acquired
The exploitation can be achieved only if a timely response
is available. Accordingly, the computer v/ill advise the
players each time the algorithms of the target acquisition
subroutine indicate an opposing unit is observed by the
maneuver unit. It must be emphasized at this point that
although the player is aware of the location of the opposing
unit, the only friendly units that can engage the target
are those which the computer has determined have observation
of the target.
During the direct fire or movement phase of the game
turn, nhe player is required to immediately indicate his
desire to engage a target with direct fire once advised
that the target has been acquired. Available information
to assist him in making this determination is provided,
such as target location, type, size, and range from the
maneuver unit. A decision by the player to engage the target
will cause the computer to immediately execute the direct
fire mission (assuming there are no game restriction that
preclude the mission from being accomplished). Figure VI .
1
charts the interactions involved in requesting immediate













Requests for decisions relative
to immediate direct fire
missions are provided during
the movement or the direct fire
phases.
This subroutine processes
immediate requests for direct
fire missions, and if the
requests are valid, immediately
executes the mission.












































IGURE VI. 1 FLOWCHART OF IMMEDIATE DIRECT FIRE REQUEST SUBROUTINE
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At the end of each game turn, each player is advised of
those opposing units observed by each of his maneuver
elements. Again he has the opportunity to direct the execu-
tion of a direct fire mission upon the potential targets,
however the mission will not be executed until the direct
fire phase of the next game turn. Therefore, the player
assumes the risk that the effects of the direct fire mission
may be preemptively reduced if his unit is targeted by the
opposition during the indirect fire phase of the next game
turn. Figure VI. 2 charts the interactions involved in
requesting planned direct fire missions.
The procedures developed in figures VI . 1 and VI. 2 concen-
trate on detailed computer prompting of the players, intended
to reduce the player contribution to a yes/no answer. This
approach significantly reduces the time it takes for a
player to respond, and hence contributes to accelerating
the tempo of the game
.
D. ASSESSMENT OF DIRECT FIRE RESULTS
Implicit in the execution of the direct fire engagement
procedures is the assumption that a unit will attack a target
with its most appropriate and potent weapon. For example,
an infantry unit equipped with an anti-tank missile will
use the missile when attacking a tank, but will use its anti-
personnel weapons when engaging another infantry unit.
In this regard there are only three categories of tar-















Only adversary units that are observable
by a unit are lifted at the end of each
game turn. If the player desires to
engage one of those units in direct fire,
this subroutine is called.
The planned direct fire requests
subroutine helps the player to generate
a target li3t to be executed in the

















The request procedure goes through
the potential targets list,
requiring only Y2S or NO answers





















is catalogued and saved to be
used in execution of the mission




FLOWCHART OF PLANNED DIRECT FIRE REQUEST SUBROUTINE
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1. Armored targets, which includes tanks and armored
personnel carriers (mounted troops)
;
2. Dismounted troops in the offense;
3. Dismounted troops in the defense.
Therefore an accounting procedure is required to assure
during the game play that the appropriate target classifica-
tion is always assigned to each unit. When a direct fire
mission is ordered, it will "be necessary to determine the
current target classification assigned the targeted unit.
Upon obtaining the target classification, the next procedural
step will be to determine which (if any) of the firing unit's
weapon systems can best defeat the target. The weapon systems
played that can defeat armored targets are aggregated as
follows:
1. Tank main gun (M60A1, M60A2, T62)
2. Anti-Tank Missiles (TOW, Sagger)
3. Anti-Tank Guns
4. Troop Anti-Tank Weapons (Dragon, RPG-7)
The weapon systems that can defeat personnel targets
(dismounted troops in the offense or in the defense) are




2. Mounted Infantry (Squad, Platoon, Company)
3. Dismounted Infantry (Squad, Platoon, Company)
Accordingly, the initial effort in the direct fire re-
sults algorithm is to determine the specific weapon system/
target combination that is applicable to the situation. The
9^

weapon systems associated with each maneuver unit are iden-
tified and quantified in the units standard Table of
Equipment. A maneuver elements Table of Equipment may be
augmented, reinforced, or otherwise modified (within the
constraints of overall unit equipment totals) by the commander
as he task-organizes his fighting elements. Note that if the
firing unit does not have an organic weapon system capable
of defeating the target, there will be no casualties re-
sulting from the ensuing fire fight.
E. DETERMINATION OF CASUALTIES
Once the specific weapon system/target pairing has been
identified, the casualty calculation routines can be entered.
There are a variety of constraints and parameters that are
unique to each weapon system/target pairing, and these unique
parameters are provided for in the logic diagrams of figures
VI. 3, VI. 5 and VI. 7. This section will discuss those con-
siderations more general in application, and more germane.
F. CALCULATION OF ARMORED CASUALTIES
The firing of one anti -armor weapon against one armored
target can be reduced down to two simple, but complementary
outcomes: success, that the target will be neutralized
(destroyed or rendered ineffective), or failure, that it
would not be neutralized. Assigning probability of kill
factors to the weapon system adequately defines the
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probabilistic outcome of this independent conflict. How-
ever, when a group of firing units confronts a group of
targets, (the resulting engagement pairings) the expected
number of successes are no longer independent of each other-
unless perfect coordination between firing units is assumed.
The method used to calculate armored casualties in this
subroutine assumes a lack of coordination between firing
units, that each firing unit picks a specific target from
a group of targets at random, and fires at it independent
of the behavior of the other firing units. Obviously the
lack of coordination or information transfer among firing
units creats inefficiency: some targets will be fired on
by more than one unit, while some will not be fired upon at
all.
The problem, simply stated, is to determine stochastic-
ally the number of kills (successes) resulting from an engage-
ment of f firing units (with a probability of kill FV =p) against
t targets. Assume:
X(n) = number of targets killed just after the n
firing unit fires.
Uj(n) = P fx(n) = j] = probability that j targets have
been killed after the n firing unit fires.
p = P, = probability of kill of the weapon system
against a target in an independent engagement.
q = (1 - P, ) = probability of a miss
t = number of targets
f = number of firing units
n = number of firing units that have fired
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The probability that there will be j kills after n units
have fired against t targets is then defined by the following:
Uj(n)-Uj(n-i)D- P + 71 + U
j _ 1
(n-1) K^^O P (IV-1)
where
JJ An) =0 if j>n
J or j<o
The equation states that the probability of j kills after
n firings is dependent upon the probabilities associated with
how many kills there were after n-1 firings. There could be
j kills after n firings only if: (1) there were j kills
after n-1 firings, and the n— shot was a miss (or a hit on
a previously killed target) ; or (2) there were j-1 kills after
n-1 firings, and the n—- shot was a kill (of a previously
unkilled target)
.
By iteratively determining the probabilities associated
with each possible number of kills after each firing unit has
fired, a set of probabilities for j kills ( ofrj^t) re-
sulting from f units firing on t targets result. To deter-
mine the number of kills for a specific engagement, it is
convenient to utilize the cumulative probability distribution
function resulting from this information. An example of the
resulting curve when P, = .60, f = 3, and t = 3 is shown in
figure VI. 3. The utility of this curve is that it establishes
thresholds for each possible outcome. Accordingly, once
having established the threshold values for all possible
outcomes for a unique P., f and t combination, selection of

























The first step in assessing
results is to determine
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This subroutine assesses the
losses accruing an armored
unit due to an adversary's
direct fire mission.
A target is considered
protected if it is in a
covering hex. A covering hex
has a predominant terrain
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for n = 0,f
and











the specific number of losses
of armored vehicles resulting
from a direct fire mission.
Pk is the probability of kill
f « number of firing units
t * number of targets
j = number of kills
n • number of units which have
fired
Uj(n) is defined as the proba-
bility of there being
exactly j kills after n
















determines the number of kills associated with the conflict.
It is precisely this procedure that is utilized to determine
the number of kills in each anti -armor weapon versus armored
vehicle direct fire engagement. This procedure is incorporated
into the logic diagram presented in figure VI. 6.
G. CALCULATION OF PERSONNEL CASUALTIES
The assumptions and procedures utilized to determine
personnel casualties resulting from indirect fire engagements
were developed with full consideration of their applicability
to direct fire engagements (see section IV. D - IV. F). The
probabilistic range of casualty outcomes was defined by the
following equations:
X = 0.5 (k.I + ktT)(R - 0.5) + 0.5 k^IT (IV-3)
KIA = X when X >
when X ^
where
I = Intensity of Fire Index (IV-4)
T = Target Size Index (see Table IV. k)
kT = Weapons System Intensity Factor
km = Target Disposition Factor
R = Uniformly distributed random number between and 1
The equations reflect the logic governing how casualties
will increase as the intensity of fire (I) brought to bear
on the target increases, and as the number of personnel in
the target area (represented by T) increases. The stochastic
range of casualty outcomes determined by the above equations,
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in conjunction with the integer rounding properties available
in computer operations, adequately serve to attrit infantry
forces when appropriate values are assigned to k_ , the weapons
system intensity factor, and the intensity of fire factor I.
Table VI . 1 lists those values determined by analysis to
provide casualty distributions closely approximating those
found in the direct fire combat results tables of the PEGASUS
manual game. Figures VI. 8, VI. 9 i and VI . 10 provide an example
of the comparative results obtained from using this approach.
TABLE VI.
1
WEAPON SYSTEM INTENSITY FACTORS
FOR DIRECT FIRE ENGAGEMENTS
Weapon System
Weapon System Intensity Factor, kj
Intensity
Descriptor, I
Tanks 0.4- Number of tank
Mounted Infantry 0.5 Size of unit















This subroutine assesses casualties
and effects resulting from direct
fire missions on troop targets.
T=l for squad-size target
T=2 for platoon-size target











5 = 2 iff H^.67
else E=3
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©1 = 1 for squad-size firing unit
1=2 for platoon-sire firing unit











E = l iff R^.33




E=3 iff R^. 67
else Z=^
For direct fire applications the general











x when x>0KIA =
when xiO
VJ
FIGURE VI. 7 (CONTINUE)
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000 001 | 000 011 ! 001 111
PLT
KIA 000 000 j 000 001 000 111
111 112










011 111 112 234
. .. .... ,i . ... ..
567 8 910
FIGURE VI. 8 EXAMPLE OF DIRECT FIRE COMBAT RESULTS TABLE





SOD 000000 000001 000011
PLT ooooii 000112 011223
CO 000112 012223 3^4666
FIGURE VI. 9 EXAMPLE OF CONSOLIDATED KIA COMBAT RESULTS TABLE
DISMOUNTED TROOPS - OFFENSE
El O IMP 1 |M TARGET UNITrinliNu UiMi i
SQD PLT CO
MOUNTED
SQD 000000 000000 oooin
PLT 000001 oooin 111222
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VII. THE MOVEMENT PHASE
A. GENERAL
It is through the simulation of movement, within realistic
time and space factors, that the interaction of the forces
and their environment can be accounted for. Actual combat
activities occur simultaneously over several areas of the
battlefield, and the activities of units in actual combat
are continuous. However, the simulation by the computer of
combat requires the sequential handling of events and the
discrete representation of units and terrain. Accordingly,
the success of a simulation is highly dependent upon its
ability to create, within the constraints of event-sequencing,
a reasonable representation of the continuum of the battle-
field. The manual PEGASUS war game, by virtue of its
dependence on numerous controllers, creates an atmosphere of
simultaneous and continuous operations for the players, even
though the battle simulation itself is conducted in a
structured, event -oriented mode. Accordingly, while develop-
ing the logic structure of the movement phase of the proposed
computer-assisted war game, an attempt has been made to




B. OVERVIEW OF THE MOVEMENT PHASE
It is within the movement phase that the players are
required to exercise their tactical decision-making abilities
in a time-constrained, stressed situation similar to actual
combat. However, the simulation, by virtue of its design
for just one player on each side, cannot hope to capture the
full impact of the multi-echelon, multi -dimensional flow of
information and decision-making typical of combat at the
battalion level.
Figure VII. 1 structures the logic of the movement phase,
and it can be readily observed that all of the conflict
engagement types and considerations discussed previously
come into play. Movement is a complex and important part
of a simulation, since movement can reveal units and hence
initiate engagements. The acquisition of targets generates
attendent decision-making pressure upon the players. Since
acquisition of targets in this simulation is limited to the
visual sensor mode, observation of an adversary unit implies
the possibility that intervisibility exists, that the observ-
ing unit has also been detected. The players decision to
engage the target just acquired is nontrivial, as it may
not be to his advantage to do so. The availability of
immediate indirect fire support (from the company's 81 mm
Mortar section) as well as the immediate direct fire capability
organic to the unit, allows each side sufficient firepower
and flexibility to cause significant attrition of its ad-









This subroutine executes the
planned movements of each
adversary, anJ interacts with




















































switch '3' off"0 3y controlling theswitches A and 3 the
computer is able to
determine which unit
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engagements are initiated when it is tactically advantageous
to do so, because the penalties for tactical mistakes or
blunder are absolute, as they are in combat.
C. TIME-SEQUENCING OF MOVEMENTS
The time-sequencing of the movement of units must be
placed in the context of the previously discussed "game-
turn." Each maneuver unit begins each game turn with an
allowance of twelve movement minutes. This allowance of time
can be expended in several ways, principally in movement,
but also in direct fire operations. Therefore, the move-
ment minute becomes more than a time-measure of movement;
it is also a measure governing a units combat capability.
The suppressive effects of indirect and direct fire engage-
ments, which degrade a units combat capability, may be
expected to result in reductions to a units movement minute
allowance for the balance of a game turn (see table IV.
5
for descriptions of the suppressive effects of indirect
and direct fires) . The importance of this discussion is
that some, or many, of the maneuver units may have already
expended a portion of their movement allowance prior to the
movement phase of the game turn. Since maneuver units would
enter this phase with varying amounts of minutes remaining,
priority of movement execution, as shown in figure VII. 2,
is given to those units with the most movement minutes re-
maining. Searches are iteratively conducted after each
















through those units (both
friendly and adversary)
with planned moves left to
determine which has the
most movement minutes left,













































>*Do you desire x/ to engage with.


















Close Assaults \ Ig3 CloseAssaultSubroutine -0
Return
FIGURE VII. 2 (CONTINUE)
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that movement) is completed, creating a semblance of event-
ordering consistent with simultaneous operations.
D. MOVEMENT EXECUTION
I
Movement of units is accomplished one hex at a time,
and as indicated previously, a movement cost (in movement
minutes) is associated with each hex, depending upon the
predominant terrain characteristics of that hex. Although
the character of the game is uniquely dependent upon the
simulation of movement, the execution of the movement is
straightforward. As shown in figures VII
.
3 and VII. 4, the
hex coordinates associated with execution of the planned
move are calculated, the predominant terrain characteristic
of the new hex is determined, and the movement cost (in
movement minutes) is found. If the unit has sufficient
movement minutes available, the planned movement is executed;
otherwise the unit remains in its old position.
E. DETECTION
Chapter V discussed in detail the considerations relating
to surveillance and target acquisition. The logic support-
ing these procedures is found in figures V.9 and V.10.
Surveillance and target acquisition have a pervasive influence
on all other aspects of the simulation; they provide the
basis upon which the battalion commanders will allocate












This subroutine executes the planned
movement for the designated unit,
providing the 'new* hex coordinates
resulting from the planned move.
The move is then verified by-
determining if sufficient movement
minutes are available to the unit












is generated when a
player wants one of his
units to 'watch* as
another unit moves,
ostensibly to be in
position to provide


















x(new) = x(old ) +2
y(new) = y(old) !KD



































If the unit has sufficient
movement minutes available,
the planned movement is
executed. Otherwise the


















This subroutine calculates the
movement coats associated with each
planned move.
Movement costs are associated with
terrain characteristics as well as







insures the move is
not executed.
Vl
FIGURE VII. 4 FLOWCHART OF MOVEMENT COSTS SUBROUTINE
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F. IMMEDIATE FIRE MISSIONS
The dynamic nature of combat is characterized by the
surveillance of a target, and the initialization of engage-
ment at the time and place most advantageous to the friendly
forces. Targets of opportunity often present themselves,
and if it is consistent with the units mission to engage
that target, battle advantages may accrue. Likewise ad-
vantages can accrue by avoiding the enemy (to avoid un-
acceptable attrition from an engagement with a larger
adversary unit)
.
Once detection occurs, the player is given the opportunity
to engage the target. His option to engage the adversary
unit with immediate direct fire remains available as long as
the unit is within observation and enough movement minutes
exist to support the direct fire mission. However, once
having engaged the enemy with direct fire the probability
of the firing unit's position being detected by the enemy
is again calculated. If the determination procedure results
in intervisibility being achieved, the targeted force may
now execute a return fire mission (at a lower effectiveness
rate because of the reactive nature of the engagement)
.
The targeted unit can also be immediately engaged by the
organic 81 mm mortar assets held at the company level. Only
2 of these missions can be executed in a game turn, and the
weapon intensity factor (KT ) used for casualty calculations
resulting from 81 mm mortar attacks is equal to 0.8.
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The programming logic associated with immediate direct
fire missions has been previously presented in figure VI. 1.
Figure VII. 5 schematically presents the procedural consider-
ations for executing immediate 81 mm mortar support.
G. CLOSE ASSAULTS
Whereas direct fires are conducted at range, close
assaults are representative of close combat engagements.
They are initiated when units close to within adjacent hexes,
and each announces its desire to pursue this intense close-
range combat. Significant casualties result from these
intense engagements, and the resulting attrition rates are
a probabilistic function of the fire power ratio associated
with the attacker vs. defender capabilities. The logic of
figure VII . 6 essentially duplicates the combat results table
for close assault conflicts used in the manual PEGASUS game.
It is noted that a probabilistic advantage accrues to the
attacker, on the average, when the attacker-to-defender fire
power ratios exceed 2:1.
H. PLANNING PHASE SUBROUTINES
When all movements are exhausted and close assaults
resolved, the players then have the opportunity to program
indirect fire support utilizing the artillery capability
assigned by higher authority to support their units. This







This subroutine assesses the casualty
and suppressive effects of immediate
indirect fire support missions. These





























A maximum of two
immediate indirect
fire missions can





























Personnel casualties are calculated using




„_ 1 x when x^-ol
*1A
" \o when xiO j
where
I = Intensity of fire index value
T = Target size index value
k_ = Weapon system intensity factor
k„= target dispostion factor
FIGURE VII.
5












This subroutine resolves clone assault
conflicts by calculat in* 1: losses and
determining associated retreat move-
ments.
Algorithms were developed to mirror
the Close Assault Table found in the












A/D Ratio is the attacker to defender




















Neither unit can move until
close assault phase next
turn 1 pinning jjction creates
varying time element in regard
to close assault combat.
V








































#loss=.50 - ,05(S 1- A/D Ratio)
For defender!
£loss = .05(R • A/D Ratio)
Casualties calculated by
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in figure IV . 1 . If enemy forces are still observable,
planned deliberate direct fire missions can be scheduled in
accordance with the routine previously presented in figure
VI. 2.
Of particular significance, the movements for each
maneuver unit are now planned and input to the computer for
execution during the next game turn. As indicated in figure
VII. 7 » an effort has been made to simplify the input procedures
in order to minimize the probability of player error, as
well as accelerate the input process. This can be anticipated
to be the most time consuming portion of the simulation;
however, extensive computer prompting with time-clock de-
fault constraints will assist and encourage each player to















































ct to indirect or
is 'observed* by
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Parent unit must remain in
place during next game turn
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platoon or company
sizedj smallest





















Suggested formatting for input
of novesi
OW Overmatch mission
DMDismourt troops from vehichles







Directional moves may be
followed oy a number
indicating number of
similar moves to -axe;
i.e.. NN^ would indicate
to move 4 hexes in north
direction.
FIGURE VII. 7 (CONTINUE)
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
This study was initiated under the premise that an
understanding of the collective structure of combat decision-
making processes might be achieved "by the study of existing
manual war games. As an initial effort in this direction,
the Army's PEGASUS war game was analyzed in depth. The
analysis developed in detail the event-sequenced logic which
comprises the battle simulation and structured it to serve
as the framework for the programming of an interactive, com-
puter-supported, battalion-level war game.
B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The framework developed is sufficiently flexible that
future weapons systems and sophisticated sensors can potentially
be incorporated into the game. Accordingly, it is recommended
that the framework be further developed in follow-on work in
order to adapt the game to interactive-computer play. The
exercising of this game with potential enhancements may
provide unique insights into the processing of information
and decision-making on the modern, automated battlefield.
The process of analyzing and structuring the logic of a
manual war game is a unique endeavor which in itself provides
some understanding of the processes of command and control
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and of the information flow requirements among and within
different echelons in the command hierarchy. Accordingly,
it is recommended that other manual games, in particular
the Army's FIRST EATTLE division level simulation, be






Preparation. Used to signify those
items resident in the data base required
to accomplish the processes that followi
an initialization symbol
Process.. Used to signify calculations,
operations and processes
Output. Used to signify those results
calculated/generated in a processing
operation
Decision. Used to indicate decision
options, determining which of a num-
ber of alternative paths are followed
Display. Used exclusively to signify
those computer generated displays of
relevaice to the players. Generally
limited to paraphrasing of queries,
prompting, or results
Auxiliary Operation. Used to represent
minor processing actions, labeling, mis-
cellaneous information, comments,
annotations
Manual Input. Used for those situa-
tions when the player must sake a
direct input into the computer via
the console
Data-Base Storage. Used to represent
those operations which essentially up-
date the data base, and are held in
storage until needed; ie., number of
movement minutes left, unit strength,
etc. Data base storage information
is accessible to multiple subroutines
Subroutine. Symbol indicates trans-
fer to a subroutine to execute labeled
processes
o Connector. On page, or within sub-routine, connector
Offpage Connector.









The following represents the author's conception of the
data base upon which the logic of the presented subroutines
was developed. The actual organization utilized if the
program were to be implemented would be dependent not only
on the computer hardware and software available, but also
on the judgement of the actual programmer.
The data used in the subroutines essentially fit into
three categories: hex-related, unit-related, and program-
related.
B. HEX-RELATED DATA
Hex-related data refers primarily to the large table
that characterizes the terrain of the battlefield. The
data items included are
:
1 . Hex Location
The location of a hex is identified by a six-digit
number consistent with military grid coordinates. The first
three digits are referred to in the program as the x-coordinates;
the second three digits are referred to as the y-coordinates
.





Associated with each hex is a dominant terrain








e. Steep and clear terrain
f Steep and wooded terrain
g. Impassable terrain
3- Hex Elevation
The average elevation of the hex is maintained for
line-of-sight calculations.
C. UNIT -RELATED DATA
Unit-related data refers to those data items that refer
to the capability, disposition and vulnerability of each unit
in the game play. The data items included are:
1. Unit Code
The unit code would identify each specific unit
being played, and would be the primary link for all other
unit-related data items. Incorporated into the unit code
would be a system that identifies:
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a. Whether the unit is a U.S. or opposing force
unit.
b. The size of the unit (squad, platoon, company).




Associated with each unit is its combat capability.
This is represented by the following data items:
a. Close Assault Factor
A factor unique to PEGASUS game which generalizes
the relative combat powers of different unit types and sizes.
b. Movement Minutes Available.
c. Unit Strength
Unit strength is characterized by the number of
personnel in the unit, if it is a troop unit, and by the
number of tanks or armored vehicles if it is an armored unit.
Attrition of these strengths is the principal objective of
the indirect and direct fire casualty algorithms.
d. Weapon Systems
Direct fire subroutines require identification
of which type (and quantity) of anti -armor weapon systems
are held by each unit. Accordingly, the number of anti-tank
guided missiles, guns, and troop anti-armor missiles held
by each unit must be identified.
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e. Type of Fire
Direct fire is broken down to include deliberate
and return fire. This data item dynamically changes during
a game turn.
f. Effectiveness
The effectiveness of a unit's direct fire is
modified by the suppressive effects of fire engagements. An
Effects Index has been created to accomodate this aspect of
combat.
3. Unit Location
The six-digit coordinate associated with each unit's
location. Tests for occupancy of a hex are accomplished by
searching through these data items, rather than through the
hex-related data base.
k. Vulnerability
Vulnerability in the unit data base is a function
of the unit disposition. Disposition refers to the combat
orientation of the unit (troops in the offense, troops in the
defense) , as well as whether or not the unit is in terrain
that protects him.
D. PROGRAM-RELATED DATA
Numerous tables and switches have been incorporated to
provide for procedural control of the program. Significant




Observation and Line-of-Sight Pairings
Indication that line-of-sight or visual contact
exists.
2. Effects Index
This index indicates the degree to which the effects
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